Furman v. Georgia and the Supreme Court\u27s Failure to Apply It by Maslowsky, Callie
60         SPICE | Philosophy, Politics and Economics Undergraduate Journal 
Furman v. Georgia and 
the Supreme Court’s 
Failure to Apply It
Callie Maslowsky
Abstract
In the case Furman v. Georgia (1972), the Supreme Court outlawed the 
death penalty on the grounds that its use constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. No majority opinion 
was written, but the plurality opinions all agreed that the amount of 
discretion in death penalty sentencing left too much room for the death 
penalty to be given arbitrarily. When the death penalty was reinstated 
in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court approved schemes that limited the 
discretion of sentencing bodies by providing sentencing guidelines, auto-
matically appealing all death penalty cases for review, or taking other 
steps to ensure there was some methodology determining which death 
penalty-eligible criminals actually receive it. In this paper, I will make 
the argument that the Court failed to effectively amend the shortcomings 
of the Furman decision. While the Court addressed discretion to give the 
death penalty by mandating sentencing guidelines be used and calling for 
review of all death penalty cases, that is only half of the issue. Sentencing 
parties also exercise discretion when deciding to give life imprisonment 
over the death penalty, a discretion that is equally open to arbitrariness. 
Because arbitrariness and abuse of discretion were the reason the death 
penalty was ruled unconstitutional in Furman, the best solution to the 
issue is the mandatory death penalty, which allows little to no room for 
arbitrariness in influencing sentencing. 
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Introduction
When the death penalty was deemed unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia 
(1972), states had the difficult task of reconfiguring their death penalty 
systems to comply with a ruling that failed to directly define both the 
problem and the solution. The per curiam decision stated only that the 
Court had found that the death penalty was cruel and unusual “in these 
[certain] cases” they had reviewed, leaving the door open for it being 
ruled constitutional in other situations, and the concurring justices had 
only limited consensus about why it was unconstitutional.1 The issue of 
arbitrariness was present, at least partially, in every one of the concurring 
opinions. Justices Douglas, Stewart and White held it as the main reason 
to declare the current system as unconstitutional, while Justices Marshall 
and Brennan acknowledged it as one of many reasons that the death 
penalty generally should be ruled unconstitutional.2 Beginning with the 
decisions made with Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Supreme Court fleshed out 
exactly what constituted a constitutional system of capital punishment, 
citing restructuring sentencing procedures to channel jury discretion and 
the addition of automatic review as ways to fix the issues brought forth 
in their review of Furman.3 However, structuring jury discretion does not 
necessarily reign it in—the Supreme Court ruled in Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 
that a jury must be allowed to hear all relevant mitigating circumstances 
the defense wishes to present, and that they must be able to use this mit-
igating evidence to justify giving life imprisonment instead of the death 
penalty.4 Thus, while the Supreme Court limited arbitrariness by way of 
structuring the way juries consider aggravating and mitigating factors, 
they preserved the jury’s ultimate tool for producing arbitrariness in the 
capital punishment system—the ability to show mercy to defendants. 
While it may seem ideal to keep mercy in sentencing, it directly challenges 
the Furman decision and subsequent cases because there will always be a 
large element of arbitrariness in sentencing so long as the jury can find, 
by whatever reasoning it chooses, that a sentence of life imprisonment 
is more appropriate than the death penalty. In order to best comply with 
1 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, MA: 
Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 162.
2 Ibid, 162-190.
3 Ibid, 200.
4 Ibid, 250-253.
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the decision of Furman and eliminate arbitrary implementation of the 
penalty, the mandatory death penalty should be made constitutional. 
The Furman Concurrences
The Furman concurrences each cited distinct rationale for deeming the 
death penalty system, as it existed at the time, cruel and unusual under 
the Eighth Amendment. Justices Brennan and Marshall took the broadest 
stance against the death penalty, holding that it no longer can be con-
sidered constitutional in the United States due to evolving standards of 
decency, its unparalleled severity, and its unnecessariness, among other 
reasons.5 Though not the central focus of either argument, both justices 
acknowledge arbitrariness as a factor in their decisions. Justice Brennan 
ties the argument against arbitrary punishment into his assertion that 
the death penalty violates basic human dignity, asserting that one way 
this dignity is violated when states “inflict upon some people a severe 
punishment that it does not inflict upon others.”6 Additionally, he 
emphasizes how the infrequency with which the death penalty is given 
is a clear indicator of the punishment being inconsistently applied and 
says that there is little logic regulating who receives the death penalty 
and who does not, calling the system “little more than a lottery.”7 Justice 
Marshall constructs an argument against the death penalty largely inde-
pendent of arbitrariness, but he still states that the death penalty should 
be denounced for being discriminatorily imposed against certain groups 
of people, which he believed most people should find “shocking” to their 
conscience and sense of justice.8 Because of their broader stances against 
the death penalty, the opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall are not 
of great use for analysis of how laws should best be amended to comply 
with the Eighth Amendment—the only way to fully accommodate these 
opinions is to outlaw the death penalty. 
Far more useful for guidance are the opinions of Justices Douglas, White, 
and Stewart, who chose to only reject the death penalty as it was applied 
5 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 165-172,  174-179.
6 Ibid, 166.
7 Ibid, 168.
8 Ibid, 178.
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in Furman, and not as a whole; each with independent reasoning behind 
their conclusion. Justice Douglas’ opinion focuses on arbitrariness as an 
offshoot of discriminatory practices due to unbridled discretion on the 
part of juries and justices. He states that laws generally qualify as unusual, 
and thus inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment, if they discriminate 
against certain groups of people intentionally, or if they are adminis-
tered under a system that is subject to bias.9 He outlines that the Eighth 
Amendment mandates “legislators…write penal laws that are…nonselec-
tive and nonarbitrary,” and holds that in the death penalty scenario, it 
is the job of justices to ensure those laws are not selectively applied to 
certain groups.10 Justice Douglas holds that the death penalty scheme on 
trial in Furman did not fit these requirements, because judges and juries 
had discretion in imposing the death penalty, enabling it to be applied in 
a discriminatory fashion.11 Thus, for Justice Douglas, it is the potential 
for and presence of discrimination in sentencing that renders the death 
penalty unconstitutional. 
Justice Stewart denounces the death penalty on the sole basis that 
there is proof of its arbitrary imposition. Although he seems to agree 
with Justices Brennan and Marshall in that the death penalty needs to 
be evaluated differently than other available punishments because of 
its unique nature, he focuses solely on the death penalty as applied in 
the case at hand instead of addressing its general use, and thus avoids 
making broad prescriptions about the use of the punishment.12 In an 
often-quoted line, Justice Stewart likens the death sentences given by 
the current system as “cruel and unusual in the same way that being 
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual” because the death penalty is “so 
wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”13 He holds that those who receive 
the death penalty are “a capriciously selected random handful” of those 
convicted of murder, and rules the death penalty unconstitutional on 
these grounds.14 Justice Stewart alludes to racial discrimination possibly 
9 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 163.
10 Ibid, 164.
11 Ibid.
12 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 172.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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being present in the system, but chooses not to base his argument for 
unconstitutionality on it, as he considers it yet to be proven that sentenc-
ing is influenced by race.15 The evident arbitrariness of the penalty’s use in 
the system is enough for Justice Stewart to deign its unconstitutionality. 
Justice White argues its unconstitutionality because of the death penalty’s 
infrequent and erratic use. He contends that the death penalty is used too 
seldom to significantly service retribution or deterrence, and thus “its 
imposition would then be pointless and needless extinction of life with 
only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purpose” 
making it “patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative 
of the Eighth Amendment.”16 Justice White does leave the door open for the 
future imposition of the death penalty, however—making sure to clarify 
that it is the way the death penalty is currently administered, and not 
the death penalty system as a whole, that is problematic. He cites issues 
with the amount of discretion wielded by juries and judges as the largest 
problem in current administration; he observes “that there is no mean-
ingful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] 
is imposed from the many cases in which it is not,” noting that legislator’s 
choice to delegate so much power to the jury in deciding whether to give 
a death sentence ultimately renders the death penalty unconstitutional.17 
Thus, Justice White holds the death penalty is unconstitutional in that it 
no longer serves the ends that once justified it because of the system’s 
dependence on discretion.
Gregg’s Conflicts with Furman
The majority opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, written by Justice Stewart, holds 
that Georgia made significant enough changes to its death penalty scheme 
to warrant its constitutionality. Justice Stewart reaffirms the majority 
belief that “the punishment of death does not invariably violate the 
Constitution,” based on the history of the death penalty in America, its 
potential service to retribution and deterrence, and the judgment that as 
a penalty, is not disproportionate to the crimes for which it is given.18 He 
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid, 173.
17 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 174.
18 Ibid, 193-195.
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then proceeds to analyze the Furman decision, asserting that in Furman, 
the death penalty “could not be imposed under sentencing procedures 
that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner.”19 To reduce the risk of arbitrary assignment of 
the death penalty over life imprisonment, “discretion must be suitably 
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary” 
decision making.20 Justice Stewart identifies two specific ways in which 
legislators could go about channeling jury discretion: bifurcation of trials 
and presenting juries with guidelines of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances to consider when making decisions.21 In bifurcating trials, the 
Court ensures that the defense has the ability at the sentencing trial to 
present information either not relevant at the guilt trial or even “prejudi-
cial to a fair determination” of guilt that may serve to mitigate the crime 
once the defendant has been convicted of it.22 Moreso related to arbi-
trariness is the recommendation for jury sentencing guidelines. Justice 
Stewart asserts that presenting the jury with state-made aggregating 
and mitigating circumstances to consider would “provide guidance to the 
sentencing authority and thereby reduce the likelihood that it will impose 
a sentence that fairly can be called capricious or arbitrary.”23 Further, 
he proposes that having the jury list what “factors they relied upon in 
reaching [their] decision” will aid when the state reviews the sentence 
and compares it to like cases.24 Justice Stewart leaves the door open for 
other possibly constitutional death penalty schemes, stating that each 
state’s chosen scheme needs to be examined individually; he evaluates 
the reconfigured system in Georgia, and determines that it has created 
enough of a structure to limit undue juror discretion to be considered 
constitutional.25 In conclusion, Justice Stewart identifies the main issue of 
Furman to be the fact that “defendants…were being condemned to death 
capriciously and arbitrarily,” and holds that the once “freakish” imposi-
tion of the death penalty has been fixed by channeling of jury discretion 
19 Ibid, 196.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid, 196-197.
22 Ibid, 196.
23 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 197.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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and the addition of automatic judicial review of all death penalty convic-
tions in Georgia.26 
While the argument presented by the majority in Gregg succeeds in demon-
strating how juror discretion can be shaped by the state in requiring jurors 
to justify their decision to give a sentence of death based on the aggra-
vating circumstances found, the opinion fails to properly address the fact 
that discretion is also exercised when a jury decides to give a life sentence 
when a death sentence would be well justified. In subsequent cases such 
as Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) and Lockett v. Ohio (1978), the Court 
took action to ensure that the jury maintained the discretion to choose life 
imprisonment over death no matter the reason they chose to do so. As put 
by Justice Scalia in his concurrence in the case Walton v. Arizona (1990), 
the Court thus embarked on creating a “counter doctrine” advocating 
for the protection of a sentencer’s “discretion to ‘decline’ to impose” a 
death sentence.27 It is clear why this is inconsistent with the decision in 
Furman; arbitrariness is inherently increased when states were barred 
from having mandatory death sentences by Woodson, as well as when 
states were prevented from limiting the possible mitigating evidence 
able to be presented during sentencing in Lockett. Justice Scalia holds that 
“it is impossible to understand why the Constitution demands that the 
aggravating standards and mitigating standards be accorded opposite 
treatment,” since both can be equal relevant for creating arbitrary 
decisions. This difference allows those making sentencing decisions to 
justify giving different sentences to perpetrators of comparable crimes, 
with any reason they see fit.28 It is in this way that allowing sentencing 
parties unbridled discretion to not impose death can open the door for 
discrimination—when all mitigating circumstances are permitted at trial, 
and all it takes is one juror defecting to lead to a sentence of life imprison-
ment instead of death, each juror has the power to choose life over death 
for any reason they see fit.29 It was held in McCoy v. North Carolina (1990) 
that a unanimity requirement for juries in finding mitigating factors 
“violate[d] the Constitution by preventing the sentence from considering 
all mitigating evidence,” therefore all it takes is one juror deciding to find 
26 Ibid, 200.
27 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 661 (1990).
28 Ibid, 666.
29 Ibid, 667.
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a mitigating circumstance to get a life sentence for a criminal who would 
otherwise receive the death penalty.30 Thus, arbitrariness persists in the 
death penalty sentencing system, encouraged by the Supreme Court; if 
the Court truly wishes to adhere to the Furman decision, this arbitrariness 
must be reduced.
The Benefits of a Mandatory Death Penalty
The best way to remove discrimination from death penalty sentencing 
is through the instatement of a mandatory death penalty for a clearly 
described class of crimes, perhaps with a very narrow class of mitigating 
circumstances permitted for consideration. When constructed correctly, 
the mandatory death penalty would address both directions of discretion 
in sentencing: the power of a sentencing body to choose to give death 
and the power of the body to give life imprisonment. Discretion would be 
channeled as it was in Gregg v. Georgia by providing the sentencing body 
with very clear descriptions of what constitutes a death penalty-eligible 
crime and requiring the sentencing body to report on what aggravators 
it found so that “discretion [is] suitably directed and limited so as to 
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”31 The possi-
bility for discretion to give life imprisonment this is entirely eliminated, 
as the choice no longer remains with the sentencing body. While this 
discretion may seem innocuous, it provides room for discrimination and 
seemingly arbitrary decisions to be produced by sentencing bodies. It is 
in this way that allowing juries unlimited discretion in the way of giving 
life imprisonment over death goes against the principles introduced 
in Furman v. Georgia. The potential for discrimination comes to light in 
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987).
McCleskey v. Kemp 
In McCleskey v. Kemp, the petitioner argued that the capital punishment 
system in Georgia was “administered in a racially discriminatory manner 
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment” because results 
found in a statistical stud known as the Baldus study showed that the 
30 McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 435 (1990).
31 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 196.
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death penalty was given significantly more to black defendants who killed 
white victims than it was given in cases with other race distributions.32 
The Court of Appeals who handled the case in its early stages held that 
since “each result [of life or death] was in the range of discretion, all are 
correct in the eyes of the law.”33 While this may be true, it seems inher-
ently unfair that discretion can be wielded in such a manner to produce 
racial disparities between those who are chosen to live and who are 
chosen to die for their crimes. A mandatory death penalty would resolve 
the claim made by McCleskey that racial considerations made black 
murderers more likely to receive the death penalty than white murderers, 
and that those who murder whites are more likely to be put to death than 
those who murder blacks.34 When death is the automatic punishment for 
all first-degree murders, this problem will disappear—the race of the 
perpetrator and victim have no weight whatsoever, even if it was uncon-
scious bias that caused the racial disparity in the first place. McCleskey’s 
claim is valid when applied to every stage of the criminal justice system 
where discrimination was possible, and while it may be difficult to prove 
intent to discriminate in the system, discrimination in sentencing can be 
addressed. Justice Powell holds that the burden of proof falls on McCleskey 
to prove that “purposeful discrimination” occurred in the Georgia sen-
tencing system.35 But even unintended discrimination warrants some sort 
of addressing. Even if the Baldus study’s results do not completely prove 
the unconstitutionality of the Georgia death penalty sentencing scheme 
on the grounds that it racially discriminates, as put by Justice Brennan 
in his dissent, “the risk that race influenced McCleskey’s sentence is 
intolerable by any imaginable standard,” and surely shows enough of an 
arbitrariness problem to warrant some sort of action on the part of legis-
lators.36 Justice Powell defends the discretion wielded by juries as playing 
a “fundamental role…in our criminal justice system,” giving jurors “final 
and unreviewable” “[exercise] of leniency.”37 Justice Brennan addresses 
this point, stating that “our desire for individualized moral judgments 
may lead us to accept some inconsistencies in sentencing outcomes,” but 
32 Ibid, 385-386.
33 Ibid, 387.
34 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 357.
35 Ibid, 388.
36 Ibid, 395.
37 Ibid, 391.
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this desire does not justify the “reject[ion] of evidence” of discrimina-
tion “drawn from the most sophisticated capital sentencing analysis ever 
performed.”38 If states are truly concerned with implementing the death 
penalty in a non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory fashion, the best means 
to do it is through a mandatory death penalty, where potential bias can be 
eliminated or at least addressed. To facilitate this, however, the Supreme 
Court would need to reverse its ruling in Woodson v. North Carolina. 
Woodson v. North Carolina
Released with the bundle of decisions that reaffirmed the use of the death 
penalty in the United States in 1976, Woodson v. North Carolina focused 
on the death penalty scheme created by North Carolina in the aftermath 
of Furman. The North Carolina General Assembly amended their death 
penalty statute by removing jury discretion wholly, holding that when a 
jury found a defendant guilty of first-degree murder, the automatic pun-
ishment would be death.39 The majority opinion rules that the mandatory 
death penalty is unconstitutional on the grounds that there is a national 
consensus against it, it fails to properly address Furman, and that it denies 
the jury consideration of mitigating circumstances, such as diminished 
capacity to understand the weight of the crime or a history of abuse. 
However, none of these claims can stand up to scrutiny.
Just as he did in the Gregg vs. Georgia decision, Justice Stewart opens with 
the facts of the North Carolina death sentencing statute, which defines 
first-degree murders and assigns the punishment of death for this “broad 
category of homicidal offenses.”40 He then moves into his denunciation 
of the death penalty, beginning with how he holds it is against contem-
porary standards of decency. Justice Stewart details the history of the 
mandatory death penalty, asserting that its transformation from wide-
spread use in colonial times to total elimination in the United States in the 
present day was due to the widespread “expression of public dissatisfac-
tion” with it. 41Even before legislators passed new death penalty schemes, 
38 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 397-398.
39 Ibid, 238.
40 Ibid.
41 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 239.
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Justice Stewart mentions a way in which individuals could personally 
express their stance against the mandatory death penalty—jury nulli-
fication. He notes a “significant number of first-degree murder cases” 
ended in verdicts of not guilty despite the apparent guilt of the defendant 
because juries “[found] the death penalty inappropriate” in these cases.42 
The issues with Justice Stewart’s argument against the mandatory death 
penalty are examined thoroughly in Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, where 
he describes how both the reduction of crimes committed for which the 
death penalty could be given as well as the legislative action increasing the 
prevalence of jury discretion—both of which Justice Stewart calls upon 
as evidence of evolving standards of decency both—have “virtually no 
relevance” to Woodson and the constitutionality of the mandatory death 
penalty.43 He holds that the narrowing of punishments receiving death 
is irrelevant, as the case considers only first-degree murder, which has 
remained a crime for which death can be deemed the appropriate punish-
ment.44 As for the historical pattern of mandatory sentencing giving way 
to jury discretion, Justice Rehnquist holds that the shift away from the 
mandatory death penalty could be in part due to a general dissatisfaction 
not with the mandatory death penalty, but instead with jury nullification 
that sometimes results from it.45 Thus, discretionary sentencing received 
wider support than just those against the mandatory death penalty because 
some people reasoned that by giving juries sentencing discretion, “fewer 
guilty defendants would be acquitted,” and society would overall be better 
off this way.46  Further, he observes that jury nullification can distort the 
unpopularity of the mandatory death penalty, since only “a single juror 
[can] prevent a jury from returning a verdict of conviction,” and concludes 
that given legislative support for the mandatory death penalty, jury nul-
lifications “[do] not indicate that society as a whole reject[s] mandatory 
punishment.”47 While Justice Stewart is correct in asserting that the 
mandatory death penalty had fallen out of favor before Furman, it cannot 
be ignored that ten states reacted to Furman by creating mandatory death 
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, 242.
44 Ibid, 243.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 243.
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penalty schemes.48 Justice Stewart describes this newfound favor of the 
mandatory death penalty as a desire to retain the death penalty in any way 
possible, and thus not evidence of “a sudden reversal of societal values” 
favoring the mandatory death penalty. However, these states certainly did 
not have to adopt this specific scheme to address the issues in Furman, as 
evidenced by the fact that many states took other approaches.49 Justice 
Rehnquist asserts that the majority’s choice to ignore the decision of 
these states is a choice to assert the Court’s opinion on the mandatory 
death penalty rather “than a conscientious effort to ascertain the content 
of any ‘evolving standard of decency’” regarding the mandatory death 
penalty.50 
Justice Stewart’s claim that the North Carolina statute fails to ade-
quately address the issue of jury discretion is ungrounded. He argues that 
“the long and consistent American experience with the death penalty” 
demonstrates that North Carolina has merely “papered over the problem 
of unguided and unchecked jury discretion,” citing sources of this discre-
tion as potential jury decisions to nullify as well as a failure on the part of 
the state to offer “standards to guide the jury in its inevitable exercise of 
the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live and which 
shall die,” and the lack of judicial review for death sentences produced by 
the scheme.51 These assertions are riddled with problems. The mandatory 
death penalty handles the issue of discretion fully, by eliminating it as 
much as a legislature can hope to—as soon as someone is found to be guilty 
of first-degree murder, they are sentenced to death. Justice Stewart’s 
assertion of a lack of guidance is unfounded, as the North Carolinian 
statute outlines very clearly what types of murder qualify as first-degree 
and stipulates that the punishment for all of these murders is death.52 
It is not clear what Justice Stewart is referring to when he mentions the 
decision a jury must make in deciding whether to assign a first-degree 
murderer to life or death, since this choice has been removed from the 
system, unless he is addressing the potential for jury nullification.53 Jury 
48 Ibid, 244.
49 Ibid, 240.
50 Ibid, 244.
51 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 241.
52 Ibid, 238.
53 Ibid, 238, 241.
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nullification would undoubtedly be a problem with the mandatory death 
penalty, but as noted by Justice Rehnquist, it is not enough of an issue 
to affect the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty.54 He holds 
that there is no reason to “conclude that the North Carolina system is bad 
because juror discretion may permit jury discretion while concluding that 
the Georgia and Florida systems are sound because they require this same 
discretion.”55 Additionally, it is not illogical that North Carolina does 
not require automatic appeals for all death sentences, because juries can 
only find someone guilty of first-degree murder if their crime fits the bill 
outlined in the statute, which clearly defines what crimes are appropriate 
for a death sentence.56 Thus, Justice Stewart’s argument for the inad-
equacy of the mandatory death penalty on the grounds that it does not 
address Furman falls apart under careful consideration. 
Lastly, Justice Stewart’s premise that the mandatory death penalty is 
unconstitutional in that it prevents jurors from considering relevant mit-
igating evidence demonstrates great tension with the Furman decision. 
There is a certain appeal to Justice Stewart’s argument on the grounds 
that mercy in capital punishment sentencing is “a constitutionally indis-
pensable part of the process,” but there is no constitutional support 
for his claim.57 His criticism that the mandatory death penalty, in not 
allowing for mitigating evidence to be properly weighted, reduces those 
convicted “not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members 
of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind inflic-
tion of the penalty of death” sufficiently sums up how many feel about 
mandatory sentencing—that it makes the criminal justice system intol-
erant of individual circumstances of a crime that may make a defendant 
seemingly less culpable than others who committed like crimes.58 But as 
Justice Rehnquist points out in his dissent, there is no basis for the claim 
that this removal of mercy violates the Eighth Amendment. He cites that 
historically the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has not been read 
to include a safeguard for individual considerations of circumstances 
beyond the facts of the crime, and holds that the “plurality opinion has…
54 Ibid, 244.
55 Ibid, 245.
56 Ibid, 238.
57 Mandery, Evan J. Capital Punishment: A Balanced Examination (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005), 242.
58 Ibid, 241.
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import[ed] into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
what it considers to be desirable procedural guarantees” that have no 
solid constitutional grounds, and are contrary to the will of legislatures.59 
Death may be different than other punishments available in the criminal 
justice system, but the constitution does not mandate the inclusion of 
mitigating evidence for sentencing death. 
Conclusion
Although it may seem harsh, the mandatory death penalty is the best 
means with which to achieve the goals set out in Furman v. Georgia—
namely, to reduce arbitrariness in death penalty sentencing. Gregg v. 
Georgia and its accompanying decisions do well to address the issue of 
unchecked jury discretion to sentence someone to death, but they do not 
address the potential for arbitrariness that comes from jurors making 
the decision to give life imprisonment instead of death. Later decisions 
reaffirm jury discretion and hold that the defense must be able to present 
all relevant mitigating evidence they wish to at sentencing, preserving and 
even further opening the door for unchecked jury discretion to give life 
imprisonment. This power gives room for mercy, but that mercy is ulti-
mately arbitrary. If the Court wishes to hold true to Furman, the Woodson 
v. North Carolina decision should be overturned, and checks should be 
placed on jury discretion.
59 Ibid, 246.
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